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For many years arbitration was viewed as a separate system of
industrial self-government, a substitute for judicial determination, in
that the process provided an autonomous resolution of workers' griev-
ances concerning the terms and conditions of employment. The
exclusivity of arbitration as a remedy or forum in employment related
matters has been eroded by federal statutes such as the Fair Labor
Standards Act,' the Equal Pay Act,
2 the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 4 the Vocational Rehabilita-
tion Act, 5 and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act.
6
Faced with the dilemma of attempting to reconcile such federal
statutes with the collective bargaining provision involved in the dis-
putes before them, some arbitrators have taken the position that they
must confine their decisions to the four corners of the contract before
them. Others, however, believe they should apply statutory law with
its concomitant criteria and policy.7
As more handicapped individuals are employed where a collective
bargaining agreement is involved, arbitrators will be required to de-
termine handicapper's rights to promotions, transfers, job security,
training and special accommodations relating to their handicap.
Unions will be required to fairly represent their handicapped mem-
bers in these arbitration hearings and in the prior grievance steps.
While the roles of employee-member-grievant, employer, union and
arbitrator are regularly being clarified by court decisions in the areas
of race and sex under the civil rights statutes, there is little known today
about such relative rights and roles relating to the handicapped. 8
Thus, the question of the proper role of "external" law in arbitration
*Partner, McGinty, Rosewane, Holverson & Brown P.C.; B.S., J.D., Wayne State Univer-
sity.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1976).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-2 (1970).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1976).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 790-94 (1976).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). See generally Feller, 2 INDUSTRY REL. L.J. (1977).
7. Block, Legal and Traditional Criteria in the Arbitration of Sex Discrimination Griev-
ances, 32 ARB. L.J. 4 (1977); see also D. FELLER, FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN
AMERICA 90-92 (1976).
8. Note, Potluck Protections for Handicapped Discriminates: The Need to Amend Title VII
to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 814 (1977).
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is crucial if the Vocational Rehabilitation Act is to be fully implemented
to protect employment rights of the handicapped. The purpose of this
Article is to examine the changing role of the arbitrator and the
growing body of private arbitration law which defines the employ-
ment rights of the handicapped. From this, trends may be predicted
and advocates for handicapped employees may find new remedies for
statutory violations in the labor contract grievance arbitration process.
ARBITRATION AS A BAR TO JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
The development of legislation which protects the rights of the
handicapped parallels the development of the Civil Rights Act.
Therefore, arbitration cases which give rise to Title VII claims pro-
vide fertile ground for analogy to arbitration cases arising under Voca-
tional Rehabilitation Act claims. The United States Supreme Court's
ruling in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.9 finally resolved the de-
bate concerning the effect of a prior arbitration decision on employ-
ment discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
The Court in Alexander specifically rejected the contention that pri-
vate arbitration could be used as a bar to individual employment dis-
crimination claims under Title VII.10 The Supreme Court reversed
two decisions which had precluded Title VII actions after unsuccessful
employee claims, pursuant to their respective arbitration hearings,
and stated that the doctrines of "election of remedies" and "equitable
estoppel" were inapplicable. 1' The Court observed that Title VII in-
volved statutory rights distinct from an employee's rights under the
labor contract even when violations of both have resulted from the
9. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
10. 415 U.S. 36, 54. The district court decision however stated that "such a result would
bring to a tragic end to ... the now prevailing arbitration procedures. Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (W.D. Col. 1971).
11. The Sixth Circuit in Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd
mem., 402 U.S. 689 (1971), relied on the doctrine of "election of remedies." This doctrine was
founded on the reasoning that both the union and the employer had mutually selected an
arbitrator under their collective bargaining agreement to render a final and binding decision.
This election would prohibit the employer from seeking other forums; thus, the court held the
arbitration decision to be binding on the employee. The court firther stated that when an
employee elects a remedy under the union contract, he places in the arbitrator's hands the
power to determine his statutory rights as well. Id. at 332.
In Newman v. Avco Corp., 451 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1971), the'Sixth Circuit described Dewey
as resting on the doctrines of "equitable estoppel" and "res judicata." Id. at 747. Here the
grievant had made full use of the arbitration process and had accepted the fruits of the arbit-
rator's award (reinstatement to his job). He then sued his employer under Title VII for further
compensation and other relief. The court said in Newman that equitable considerations under
the doctrine of estoppel militate strongly against allowing one to accept the fruits of an award
and then to later dispute its validity.
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same factual situation. The Court made it clear that an employee does
not waive his statutory remedies by processing a grievance claim
under the Civil Rights Act. l2 Therefore, an employee who believes
that he has been subjected to discriminatory employment practices
may pursue remedies under an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment and simultaneously, or subsequently, commence a Title VII ac-
tion with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
or in the federal courts.
The existence of a judicial remedy does not minimize the policy
reasons favoring arbitration. The Supreme Court in Alexander rein-
forced the arbitration process as a means of resolving disputes under
a labor contract, including claims of employment discrimination. The
Court noted that the grievance and arbitration procedure has the ad-
vantage of being an inexpensive and expeditious mechanism that
brings satisfactory results to both employer and employee.13 The
Court also noted that by making available the conciliatory process of
arbitration, an employer may obviate the employees' need to resort to
a judicial forum. Furthermore, both the employer and the employee
would be saved the frustrations associated with litigation in federal
courts. 14
12. The relevant arbitration provisions in a collective bargaining agreement usually read as
follows:
Any disputes, misunderstandings, differences or grievances arising between the
parties as to the meaning, interpretation and application of the provisions of this
agreement, which are not adjusted as herein provided, may be submitted to the
Board of Arbitration for decision ...
The arbitrator may interpret this agreement and apply it to the particular case
under consideration but shall, however, have no authority to add to, subtract from,
or modify the terms of the agreement. Disputes relating to discharges or such mat-
ters as might involve a loss of pay for employees may carry an award of back pay in
whole or in part as may be determined by the Board of Arbitration.
The decision of the Board of Arbitration shall be final and conclusively binding
upon both parties, and the parties agree to observe and abide by same. ...
The Management of the works, the direction of the working force, plant layout
and routine of work, including the right to hire, suspend, transfer, discharge or
otherwise discipline any employee for cause, such cause being: infraction of com-
pany rules, inefficiency, insubordination, contagious disease harmful to others, and
any other ground or reason that would tend to reduce or impair the efficiency of
plant operation; and to lay off employees because of lack of work, is reserved to the
Company, provided it does not conflict with this agreement. . ..
United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing, 363 U.S. 564, 565 n.1 (1960) citing
1959 United Steelworkers Contract.
13. 415 U.S. at 55.
14. Id. at 55.
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Alexander does not discourage the arbitration of employment dis-
crimination claims. 15 Indeed, the Court took a strong position favor-
ing arbitration:
We think . . . that the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor
disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory employment
practices can best be accommodated by permitting an employee to
pursue fully both his remedy tinder the grievance-arbitration clause
of a collective bargaining agreement and his cause of action under
Title VII. The federal court should consider the employee's claim
de novo. The arbitral decision may be admitted as evidence and
accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate.'
6
However, in a footnote, the Court in Alexander said:
"We adopted no standards as to the weight to be accorded an ar-
bitral decision. . . . Where an arbitral determination gives full
consideration to any employee's Title VII rights, a court may
properly accord it great weight."17
ARBITRATOR'S APPLICATION OF EXTERNAL LAW
With the foundation laid by Alexander, it is necessary to consider
the decision's relevancy to the rights of a handicapped employee
whose grievance is to be adjudicated by an arbitrator.' 8 Just as Title
VII embodies the national policy concerning racial and gender dis-
crimination, the Vocational Rehabilitation Act is the articulated fed-
eral policy against discriminatory employment practices as they relate
to the handicapped.1 9 Therefore, an arbitrator involved in a handicap
15. Id. at 57-58.
16. Id. at 60. The statutory remedy provided for in the courts is in addition to and distinct
from remedies found within the collective bargaining contract as determined by the arbitrator.
Therefore, intervention by courts in this grievance process should not be confused with review
of the arbitration decision itself. In 1960, the Supreme Court in three allied cases, defined the
relative function of the courts and the arbitrator. In the Steelworkers' Trilogy, United Steel
Workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), United Steel Workers v. Warrier Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), United Steel Workers v. Enterprize Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960), the Court held that the judicial review of an arbitrator's decision is limited.
However, the employee who institutes an action Linder Title VII is not seeking review of an
arbitrator's decision, but rather he is asserting a statutory right independent of the arbitration
process.
17. Id. at 59-60.
18. See Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Crossroads: The 'Common Law of the Shop' v.
External Law, 32 ARB. J. 65 (1977); see generally Murphy, The Impact of ERISA on Arbi-
tration, 32 ARB. J. 123 (1977).
19. The Vocational Rehabilitation Act is the federal government's statutory policy against
discrimination in employment practices as they relate to the handicapped. Section 503 of the
Act was implemented by the United States Department of Labor by the promulgation of regula-
tions 41 C.F.R. 60.741.1-.54 (1977) (effective June 11, 1974, as amended, effective May 17,
1976). Under these regulations, government contractors must agree not to discriminate against
1092 [Vol. 27:1089
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case should consider the Vocational Rehabilitation Act in the same
way many arbitrators use Title VII in race and gender cases.2 0 Failure
to do so could result in nonenforcement of the award by the courts21
because of the existence of additional statutory rights.
22
Some arbitrators have consistently maintained that they are bound
by applicable external law.2 3 For example, Arbitrator Robert G.
Howlett insisted that: "Arbitrators, as well as judges, are subject to
and bound by law whether it be the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States or a city ordinance. All contracts are
subject to statutes and common law; each contract includes all appli-
cable law." 24 Yet, in the past, arbitrators have not consistently
applied external laws such as the Fair Labor Standards Act or Title
VII. 2 5 Other arbitrators have taken the position that where agencies
any physically or mentally handicapped employee with respect to any position for which the
individual is "qualified." 41 C.F.R. § 60.741.6 (1977). Handicapped is defined to include
among other things, cosmetic disfigurement, epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease,
mental retardation and specific learning disabilities. The United States Attorney General has
interpreted these regulations to include drug addiction and alcoholism. 41 C.F.R. § 60.741.2
(1977). This broad definition of a handicapped individual includes disabilities well beyond those
generally regarded by laymen to be a handicap.
Furthermore, a qualified handicapped individual is defined by the regulations as a handi-
capped person who is capable of performing a particular job with a reasonable accommodation
to the handicap. The key to this definition is "reasonable accommodations." 41 C.F.R. §
60.741.6 (1977). A government contractor must make a reasonable accommodation to the physi-
cal and mental limitations of an employee or applicant for employment unless the contractor can
demonstrate that such an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the conduct of
the contractor's business. 41 C.F.R. § 60.741.6(d) (1977). Though Section 503 does not give
employees of federal contractors the power to enforce its provisions by means of private lawsuit,
Rogers v Frito-Lay, Inc., C.A. No. 3-76-1481-C (N.D. Tex. 1977), Section 504 has been held to
provide implicitly for a private cause of action. Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth. 548
F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977). These regulations apply to each recipient of federal financial assis-
tance from the Department of HEW. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h) (1977). These regulations, therefore,
cover most public entities, including municipalities, school systems and colleges. The basic de-
finition of a handicapped person is the same as the Department of Labor's definition. 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(k), (i) (1977).
20. Hill & Sinicropi, Excluding Discrimination Grievances from Grievance and Arbitration
Procedures: A Legal Analysis, 33 ARB. J. 17 (1978).
21. See UAW Local 985 v. Chace Co., 64 L.R.R.M., 2098 (E.D. Mich. 1966), in which the
court refused to enforce an award which required the violation of state law.
22. Note, The False Hope of a Footnote: Arbitration of Title VII Disputes After Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 8 LoY.CHI. L.J. 847 (1977).
23. Gross, The Labor Arbitrator's Role: Tradition and Change, 25 ARe. J. 221 (1970).
24. HOWLETT, THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 83 (BNA 1967); but see
D. FELLER, FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 90-96 (1976).
25. St. Regis Paper Co. v. United Paper Workers Int'l Union, 65 Lab. Arb. 802 (1975)
(Young, Arb.); Millnocket Sch. Comm. v. Millinocket Educ. Ass'n, 65 Lab. Arb. 805 (1975)
(Purcell, Arb.); Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 65 Lab. Arb. 504
(1975) (O'Koven, Arb.); Wausau Dist. Pub. Sch. v. Wausau Educ. Ass'n, 64 Lab. Arb. 187
(1975) (Marshall, Arb.), Walled Lake Consol. Sch. v. Walled Lake Educ. Ass'n, 64 Lab. Arb.
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or commissions have been empowered by the government to enforce
certain regulations, the arbitrator may not substitute his judgment
and intercede to protect statutory rights.2 6 The nonapplication of ex-
ternal law is particularly prevalent when a question arises as to the
application of certain state statutes.
27
In summary, the existence of federal and state legislation allows tile
handicapped employee to pursue not only the grievance arbitration
239 (1974) (McCormick, Arb.); Merrill Area Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Merrill Area Educ. Ass'n,
63 Lab. Arb. 1106 (1974) (Schurke, Arb.); Chippewa Valley Bd. of Educ. v. Chippewa Valley
Educ. Ass'n, 62 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 409 (1974) (McCormick, Arb.); Clio Educ. Ass'n v. Clio
Area Sch. Dist., 61 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 37 (1973) (McCormick, Arb.).
26. Ingrahm Co., 48 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 884 (1966) (Yogoda, Arb.)
27. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 333 (3d ed. 1973). In addition
to federal legislation, state laws also have an impact upon arbitration decisions. Several states
have recently enacted laws which in many ways reiterate the general obligation of those who
receive federal funds covered by the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See, e.g., 134
ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.160 (Supp. 1974); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1410-33 (West Supp. 1976);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-122 to 128 (Supp. 1977); HAW. REV. STAT. .78-1 to 10 (Supp.
1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 851-867 (1976); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1 to 13 (Burns
Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 4561-4613 (West Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B,
§§ 17-20 (Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § 24K (West Supp. 1977) (Michie Law
Co-op 1976); Micii. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 395.301-.307 (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-14
(West Supp. 1976); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 613.310-430 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
354-A:1-:14 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to 38 (West 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
128-15.3 (Supp. 1973); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.400-.435 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 9
951-63 (Purdon Supp. 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-5-1 to 39 (Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 8-4131 AND 4132 (Supp. 1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 497 (1967); VA. CODE §
40.1-28.7 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60-010-320 (Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE §
5-11-1 to 19 (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31-.37(1974). One example, the state of
Michigan Handicappers Civil Rights Act of 1976. MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. §§ 37.1101-37.1605
(West Supp. 1977); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.550 (101) (Callaghan 1977); is a comprehensive state
law which protects handicapped persons. It encompasses employment, union membership,
housing, education, public services and public accommodations. The earlier Michigan Law (Bar-
rier Free Design Act) MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 125.1351-125.1389 (West 1976 and Supp.
1978) MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.447 (121) (Callaghan 1977); affects new construction and remodel-
ing to guarantee accessibility. The Michigan law substantially reflects the pre-existing federal
legislation. This statute will be enforced by the Michigan Civil Rights Commission under paral-
lel procedures utilized tinder the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§
125.1351-125.1389 MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.447 (121) (Callaghan 1977); for race, sex, religion,
etc. There are no current rqles, regulations or guidelines established for the Michigan law, but
it is realistic to anticipate that the state guidelines will follow the previously discussed Depart-
ment of Labor and HEW regulations. Though thirty-six other states have enacted comparable
laws, there are only a few omnibus civil rights acts for the handicapped now in effect. See, e.g.,
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420 (West Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601 A 7 (West 1975); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 13-2 (1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West 1974). See also Calif. Dep't
of Rehabilitation, Digest of State Laws, Relating to the Disabled (1977). This had been the
subject of critical comment by other legal authors. See Note, Abroad in the land: Legal Strategies
to Effectuate the Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61 GEo. L.J. 1501 (1973); Achtenberg, "Clips'"
United to Enforce Symbolic Laws: Legal Aid for the Disabled: An Overview, 4 U. SAN FERN. V.
L. REV. 161 (1975); ten Brock, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of
Torts, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 841 (1966).
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route and to simultaneously file a claim with a state or federal agency,
but also provides a judici4l forum if he fails to achieve his objective
by arbitration. Although many employers are generally covered either
by a federal or state law which protects the rights of the handi-
capped, 28 the advocate will have to carefully consider the applicable
law for each specific employment situation.
UNION'S DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
Another issue is the impact of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act on
the union's duty to represent a handicapped employee in the griev-
ance arbitration process. Faced with a grievance of a handicapped
member charging discrimination under the collective bargaining
agreement, the union may consider several courses of action. The
union might refuse to carry the grievance forward through the griev-
ance procedure, thus requiring the individual employee to seek a
remedy in the federal or state courts. However, while refusing to
process the grievance under the agreement, the union could instead assist
the member in a claim either under federal or state law, or both. If
the union chooses to process the grievance under the agreement5 it
could pursue the case up to and through arbitration, or stop short of
arbitration. A final alternative would be to elect to process the griev-
ance through the grievance procedure including arbitration and, if
necessary, through the federal courts.
29
It is arguable, however, under the mandate of the Supreme Court
in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co. 30 that a union has a statutory
obligation to represent all members of the bargaining unit through
the grievance procedures. The obligation implies that the union make
an honest effort to serve the interests of each member without hostil-
ity to any, in spite of alternative remedies that may be open to a
particular member. Futhermore, under the standard set forth in Vaca
v. Sipes,3' a breach of statutory duty of fair representation occurs
when the union's conduct toward a member of the collective bar-
gaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Therefore, a
union representative should carefully consider a decision not to follow
28. In one case an arbitrator did decide that a contract prohibited discrimination on the
basis of race, color, creed, national origin, sex, age, union-membership or activity, In re Met-
ropolitan Dist. Comrn'n and American Federation of State, County, Municipal Employees,
Local 184, 64 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1088 (1975) (Blum, Arb.).
29. See generally Hill, The Union's Duty to Process Discrimination Claims, 32 Lab. Arb. J.
180 (1977).
30. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
31. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 193 (1967).
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through with the grievance because it might be construed as a failure
to follow all avenues, both in arbitration ,and litigation, and, there-
fore be considered a breach of its duty of fair representation.
ANALYSIS OF RECENT ARBITRATION DECISIONS
INVOLVING HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES
In a grievance proceeding involving the rights of handicapped
employees, arbitrators are more likely to consider company problems
than are the courts or administrative agencies. 32 In addition, arbitra-
tion decisions rendered since the enactment of the Vocational Re-
habilitation Act illustrate that arbitrators have ignored all statutes
concerning the rights of the handicapped. In some cases, such as
Hyco, Inc., 33 the result probably would have been the same, even if
the statutory provisions had been applied. In that case, an epileptic
employee, after a seizure, was given a second chance on a safer job.
The arbitrator appears to have required the employer in this case to
make a "reasonable accommodation." However, if the arbitrator had
reached the opposite result, an alternative method could involve ac-
tion by a civil rights agency urging the employer to rehire the dis-
charged epileptic employee even though he had lost his arbitration
case. If the case were pursued in a judicial forum, a court would not
have to defer to the arbitrator's decision. Moreover, it is arguable
that if the arbitrator did not consider the standards set forth in the
federal regulations or relevant state laws, a result sustaining a dis-
charge of the epileptic might be reversed.
Similarly, in a recent arbitration case, Greyhound Lines, Inc., 34 an
arbitrator determined that a bus driver who had suffered a heart at-
tack, and whose neutral physician had concluded he was qualified to
return to work, could be precluded from returning to his assignment
because of the company's concern for the public's safety. Again,
though it seems clear that the employer here was the recipient of
federal funds as a contractor, there was no consideration given to the
32. See Northrup, Antidiscrimination Legislation, Labor Relations and Public Policy Series,
Wharton School, U. Penn. (1976); See also Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimina-
tion: an Empirical Study, cited in ARBITRATION-1975, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 59-92 (BNA 1976).
33. Hyco, Inc., 76-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 5379 (1976) (Nichols, Arb.). But see Birming-
ham Sch. Dist., 95 A.I.S. 6 (1977) (Groty, Arb.) for a contrary result in a situation clearly
covered by section 504. See also White Cap Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aeros-
pace Workers, 75 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCII) 4260 (1975); Kovarsky & Vern Hauck, Arbitration
and the Epileptic, 28 LAB. L.J. 597 (1977).
34. Greyhound Lines, Inc. and Council of Greyhound Divisions, 77-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCII) 4561 (1977) (Turkus, Arb.).
1096 [Vol. 27:1089
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Vocational Rehabilitation Act. The arbitrator did, however, consider
public policy as it related to regulations promulgated by the Depart-
ment of Transportation. Nonetheless, the public policy as it related to
the employment of the handicapped appears to have received no
consideration. 35 Pursuant to the Alexander Court's rationale, the affected
driver should still be able to file a complaint with HEW alleging
employment discrimination. He may also be able to file suit in the
federal courts. His claim might not be sustained since the employer
could defend on the basis that the presence of a heart condition
legitimately disqualified the employee from driving a bus. A favorable
court decision on behalf of the employee would allow the employee
to return to his job in spite of an arbitrator's decision to the con-
trary.
3 6
In another case, United States Postal Service (Miami, Florida),37
the demotion of a postal employee for reasons of his handicap was
sustained by the arbitrator. This case is another example of the arbi-
trator's failure to consider the question of whether the employer had a
duty to make a reasonable accommodation within his regular job clas-
sification rather than to demote the handicapped employee. The ar-
bitrator appeared to focus entirely on the requirements of the labor
agreement. Under the Alexander analogy, by pursuing a simultaneous
or subsequent review of his rights in court under the governing fed-
eral statutes, one could achieve a different result from that gained
through arbitration.
In another case involving a bus company, 38 the arbitrator did order
reinstatement of a bus driver who had been terminated for a failure
to fully disclose certain information on his pre-employment applica-
tion about a previously sustained neck injury. Even though HEW and
the Department of Labor regulations limit an employer's right to ask
pre-employment questions related to physical handicaps,3 9 the arbi-
trator never considered these regulations. Certainly, pre-employment
35. id.
36. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), is an analogous case.
In Hodgson an age discrimination issue was raised with regard to a policy which refused to
consider applications for inter-city bus drivers from individuals age 35 or older. The carriers
relied on the theory that the policy fell within an exception to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 4(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (Supp. 1978). The company contended that
age was a bonifide occupational qualification related to the likelihood of risk of harm to passen-
gers. The court found that it was the carrier's burden to establish the existence of a rational
correlation between drivers over the age of 35 and potential risk to passengers.
37. 6 L.A.I.G. 1720 (1976) (Kelliher, Arb.).
38. Chicago Transit Auth. and Amalgamated Transit Union, 6 L.A.I.G. 1723 (1976) (Kel-
liher, Arb.).
39. 41 C.F.R. § 60.741.6 (c) (1977).
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application questions having to do with race, age, religion, color, or
national origin have been closely reviewed by the EEOC for many
years. 40 It could be expected that an arbitrator is likely to react nega-
tively if an employer posed improper questions about an applicant's
race, and then dismissed an employee who did not answer the ques-
tions fully. The arbitrator in this case determined that the grievant
should be returned to work, but his award was not premised upon
federal regulations governing appropriate pre-employment questions.
One can only speculate as to the result in a judicial forum if the
arbitrator had sustained the discharge.
In a final example, Weber Manufacturing Co., 41 the arbitrator
found that the employer was justified in discharging an epileptic fol-
lowing his second epileptic seizure while at work in a company plant.
The arbitrator determined that the employer was reasonable in con-
tending that it was unsafe for the grievant and others if he continued
on his job. 42 The employee's doctor could not say that the grievant
would not have subsequent seizures even though he took his pre-
scribed medicine. Furthermore, the employer claimed there was not
another position within the bargaining unit that the grievant was able
to fill without the alleged hazard. The question of "reasonable
accommodation" under the law was not taken into account by the
40. The EEOC Guidebook for employers states the following:
b. Application Forms and Pre-Eimployment Inquiries.
EEOC and the courts have found that many common pre-employment inquiries
disproportionately reject minorities and females and usually are not job related.
Some of these questions have been explicitly prohibited by courts where they
have been shown to have discriminatory effect; the exact legal status of other ques-
tions is still to be determined.
Use these pragmatic guidelines: "Does this question tend to have a dispropor-
tionate effect in screening out minorities and females?" "Is this information neces-
sary to judge this individual's competence for performance of this particular job?"
"Are there alternate, non-discriminatory ways to secure necessary information?"
Major questions which should be eliminated from pre-employment inquiries (ap-
plication forms and interviews) or carefully reviewed to assure that their use is job
related and non-discriminatory in effect, include:
Race, National Origin, Religion. Pre-employment inquiries about race,
color, religion or national origin, do not constitute per-se violations of Title
VII,** but such inquiries or recording such information in personnel files
will be examined very carefully should discrimination charges arise.
1 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT 40 (1974).
41. Weber Mfg. Co., Inc. v. International Woodworkers of America, Local IV-322, 63 Lab.
Arb. Rep. 56 (BNA) (1974) (Yeager, Arb.); see generally 45 C.F.R. § 84.11 (a) (4) (1977). See
also Greenlee Bros. & Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Unity Lodge 1553, 67
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 847 (1976) (Wolff, Arb.); Bethehem Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers
of America Local 2609, 64 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 447 (1975) (Reel, Arb.).
42. 63 Lab. Arb. 56, 59-60 (BNA) (1974).
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arbitrator.43 Possibly, this employer was not subject to federal law
and there was no relevant state law. If that were the case, there
would be no forum for a further review. If there were governing stat-
utes, however, the union's failure to argue the statutory rights of its
handicapped member or its failure to assist him in his claim with the
proper government agency could be deemed to be a failure to fairly
represent a member in a subsequent lawsuit.
44
CONCLUSION
Arbitrators in the future should be cognizant of the statutory rights
of the handicapped as they analyze cases involving a demotion,
transfer, failure to promote, discharge or any other employer action
affecting wages, hours and conditions of work of handicapped
employees. Arbitrators have not considered the statutes protecting
the handicapped in the past and, based on their slow reaction to Title
VII rights, it will take time to bring about a change. 45 The handi-
capped community should be certain that unions, employees and
arbitrators alike are aware of the law. Members of unions and
employees who are handicapped must be given the fullest protection
under state and federal laws in order to gaii employment which is free of
discrimination. The broad definition of who is handicapped and the
concept of reasonable accommodations, concepts with which unions,
employers and arbitrators have been unfamiliar, need to be applied
in the administration and enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ments. A broad application of the Alexander and Vaca decisions
43. For examples of cases in which arbitrators have given consideration to the requirement
of "reasonable accommodations", see Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co. v. International
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Lodge 1010, 59 Lab). Arb. Rep. (BNA) 197 (1972)
(Davis, Arb.) (arbitrator withheld the final decision on discharge of an emotionally unstable
employee, pending investigation of alternative job possibilities); Carnation Co. v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 274, 60 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 674 (1973) (Hayes, Arb.)
(employer violated the contract by discharging a truck driver discovered to have defective vision
instead of assigning an alternative job based on seniority).
44. Indeed, such is the employer's duty under 41 C.F.R. § 60-7414 (e) (1977).
45. For three earlier cases see Nat'l Fireworks Ordinance Corp. v. Int'l Assoc. of
Machinists, Lodge 502, 23 La). Arb. 349 (1954) (Larson, Arb.) (employer rightfully required an
employee to undergo surgery to correct a hernia); Int'l Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Workers of
America, Local 128-A, 19 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 253 (1950) (Waller, Arb.) (management may
reassign an employee to a less hazardous job to protect the health and safety of the employee);
Consol. Vultee Aircraft Corp. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, Aeronautical Industrial District
Lodge, 776, 10 Lab. Arb. Rep. 951 (BNA) (1948) (Aaron, Arb) (employer has the right to take
precautions against contingent liability for injuries by requiring as a condition of rehiring that
the employee sign a waiver with respect to a minor handicap).
1978] 1099
1100 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1089
should result in both fair representation and complete and mean-
ingful arbitration hearings on employment complaints of handicapped
employees working under union contracts.
